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ABSTRACT 
Sidgwick believed that, when impartial reasons conflict with self-interested reasons, there 
are no truths about their relative strength. There are such truths, I claim, but these truths 
are imprecise. Many self-interested reasons are decisively outweighed by conflicting impar-
tial moral reasons. But we often have sufficient self-interested reasons to do what would 
make things go worse, and we sometimes have sufficient self-interested reasons to act 
wrongly. If we reject Act Consequentialism, we may have to admit that we sometimes have 
sufficient or even decisive impartial reasons to act wrongly. But these are early days. We 
may be able to resolve some of these disagreements. 
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1. SIDGWICK’S PROFOUNDEST PROBLEM 
Sidgwick asked: 
How should I live? What should I care about, and what should I do? 
Two answers seemed to Sidgwick to be clearly true. There are, he believed, 
two supremely rational aims: Our Own Good and Universal Good. As some 
Rational Egoists claim: 
We have most reason to do whatever would be best for ourselves. 
As some Impartial Rationalists claim:  
We have most reason to do whatever would be impartially best, by be-
ing, on the whole, best for everyone. 
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These beliefs might both be true. In what Sidgwick called a ‘rational Universe’, 
Our Own Good would never conflict with Universal Good. But Sidgwick reluc-
tantly concluded that the actual Universe is not rational. He believed that 
(A) in some cases, one of our possible acts would be impartially best, but 
another act would be best for ourselves.  
These beliefs together imply that 
(B) in such cases, we would have most reason to act in each of these 
ways. 
But this conclusion is a contradiction, which couldn’t possibly be true. We 
couldn’t have more reason, or most reason, to act in each of two different ways. 
 
I claimed that, to avoid this contradiction, Sidgwick revised his beliefs. Accord-
ing to what I called Sidgwick’s 
Dualism of Practical Reason, or DPR: We have most reason to do what-
ever would make things go impartially best, unless some other act would 
be best for ourselves. In such cases, we would have sufficient reasons – 
or enough reason – to act in either way.  
Sidgwick made some remarks which suggest DPR. In his brief autobiography, 
Sidgwick wrote: 
No doubt it was, from the point of view of the Universe, reasonable to prefer the 
greater good to the lesser, even though the lesser good was the private happiness 
of the agent. Still it seemed to me undeniably reasonable for the individual to 
prefer his own. The rationality of self-regard seemed to me as undeniable as the 
rationality of self-sacrifice. 1 
There is no contradiction here, since it might be reasonable and rational to 
have either of these conflicting preferences. 
As de Lazari-Radek and Singer point out, it is not clear that Sidgwick did 
revise his beliefs by accepting DPR. Sidgwick never dropped his claim that, if 
we sometimes have to choose between some act that is impartially best and 
some act that is best for ourselves, ‘Practical Reason’ would not be ‘consistent 
with itself’. Such cases would  
force us to admit an ultimate and fundamental contradiction in our apparent in-
tuitions of what is Reasonable in conduct […] from this admission it would seem 
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to follow that the apparently intuitive operation of the Practical Reason, mani-
fested in these contradictory judgments, is after all illusory. 2 
Sharing my high opinion of Sidgwick’s Methods, de Lazari-Radek and Singer 
write:  
If the conclusion of the best book ever written on ethics is that some of our ap-
parently most solid and carefully examined intuitions about practical reason are 
illusory, this poses a serious problem for anyone who, like Parfit, defends the 
view that we can know some ethical judgments to be objectively true because 
they are based on reason. 
According to what we can call this 
Objectivist’s Problem: If there are contradictions between some of our 
most carefully considered normative intuitions, we cannot justifiably be-
lieve that we know some objective normative truths.  
Sidgwick, I believe, overstates this problem. By revising his beliefs in the way 
described by DPR, Sidgwick could avoid this contradiction. He could also de-
ny that our need to revise some of our intuitive beliefs shows that no such be-
liefs could be justified. When Sidgwick calls these beliefs ‘intuitive’, he is not 
referring to some mysterious faculty with which we can somehow be in causal 
contact with normative truths. He means that, as in the case of our logical and 
mathematical beliefs, we can reach some true normative beliefs, not by observ-
ing the world and doing experiments, but merely by thinking carefully about 
certain questions. When Sidgwick adds that some intuitive beliefs are self-
evident, he does not mean that these beliefs could not be mistaken. He means 
only that what justifies these beliefs is not that we can derive them from other 
true beliefs, or that we have evidence in their favour, but their content, or what 
we are believing. Any such belief, he writes, ‘may turn out to have an element 
of error.’ There were such errors, he could claim, in his earlier intuitive beliefs 
which together implied the contradictory conclusion that we sometimes have 
most reason to act in each of two different ways.    
Though Sidgwick could avoid this contradiction by accepting DPR, he 
would have found this view deeply disappointing. Sidgwick hoped that, when 
one act would be impartially best but another act would be best for ourselves, 
Practical Reason would tell us what to do. If DPR were true, Practical Reason 
would give us no guidance, being ‘divided against itself.’  
 
 
2 ME 508. 
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Sidgwick’s problem can be restated in moral terms. It seemed to Sidgwick to 
be clearly true both that  
we have most reason to do our duty, by doing what would be impartially 
best, 
and that 
we have most reason to do what would be best for ourselves. 
These beliefs imply that 
when one act is our duty but another act would be best for ourselves, we 
would have most reason to act in each of these ways.  
But this conclusion is another contradiction, which couldn’t possibly be true. 
As Sidgwick wrote, if duty and self-interest sometimes conflict,  
the whole system of our beliefs as to the intrinsic reasonableness of conduct 
must fall [...] we may perhaps still find in the non-moral universe an adequate ob-
ject for the Speculative Reason, capable of being in some sense ultimately under-
stood. But the Cosmos of Duty is thus really reduced to a Chaos: and the pro-
longed effort of the human intellect to frame a perfect ideal of rational conduct 
is seen to have been foredoomed to inevitable failure.3 
These magnificently sombre claims are, I claimed, overstatements. Sidgwick 
would avoid this contradiction if, as I suggested, he revised his beliefs. Accord-
ing to what I called Sidgwick’s 
Dualism of Duty and Self-Interest, or DDS: When we have a duty to act 
in one way, but another act would be best for ourselves, we would have 
sufficient reasons – or enough reason  – to act in either way.  
There is again no contradiction here. But if DDS were true, that would gravely 
undermine morality. We would have to admit that  
whenever it was against our interests to do our duty, we would have suf-
ficient reasons to act wrongly. 
Sidgwick was not unusual in regarding such cases as undermining morality. 
Many other people have believed that, if there could be such cases, morality 
would be undermined. There cannot be such cases, many of these people have 
believed, because wrong acts would all be punished either in Hell or in some 
reincarnated life on Earth. Reid wrote that if it could be against our interests 
to do our duty, we would be faced with ‘this miserable dilemma, whether to be 
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a knave or a fool’. We would be a knave if we didn’t do our duty, but a fool if 
we did. 
2. MORAL AND SELF-INTERESTED REASONS 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest a solution to Sidgwick’s problem. Our 
most fundamental normative beliefs are not beliefs about the natural world, 
for which we might have empirical evidence. These beliefs are like other non-
empirical beliefs, such as logical and mathematical beliefs. We have some of 
these beliefs because they are clearly or obviously true. When we know, for ex-
ample, that  
(C) some argument is valid and has true premises,  
it is clear both that  
(D) this argument’s conclusion must be true,  
and that  
(E) we have a decisive reason to believe this conclusion.  
Though (E) is a normative belief, this belief is as clearly true as the logical and 
modal belief stated by (D).  
 
Of the contradictory beliefs that seemed to Sidgwick to be clearly true, one 
was the Rational Egoist’s belief that  
(F) we have most reason to do whatever would be best for ourselves. 
We can challenge this belief, de Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest, with an evo-
lutionary debunking argument. Most of us care about our own well-being 
much more than we care about the well-being of strangers. Natural selection 
explains this fact, since those early humans whose genes made them more self-
interested would have been more likely to survive and spread these genes. 
When our ancestors came to believe that they had most reason to do what 
would be best for themselves, this belief merely endorsed these self-interested 
motives. These motives and this belief would have been reproductively advan-
tageous whether or not this belief is true. When we realize that we were caused 
to believe (F) in a way that was unrelated to whether this belief is true, that 
casts strong doubt on this belief.  
 
No such argument applies to the Impartialist’s belief that  
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(G) we have most reason to do whatever would be impartially best, by 
being, on the whole, best for everyone. 
This belief cannot be similarly challenged, because it cannot be given any such 
evolutionary explanation. Wholly impartial motives and beliefs would have 
made early humans less likely to survive and spread their genes. Since there is 
no such debunking explanation for the Impartialist’s belief, we can claim that 
we have this belief because, as rational beings, we have recognized the truth 
that everyone’s well-being matters equally. We can see that our own suffering is 
not worse than the equal suffering of anyone else, or any other sentient being. 
This argument has, I believe, some force. But, as de Lazari-Radek and Sing-
er concede, this argument is not decisive. They claim only that,  
if the rationality of egoism can thus be put in doubt, we can tentatively 
conclude that all reasons for action are impartial. 
I suggested another argument against (F). Rational Egoists believe that we 
ought to be equally concerned about all the parts of our life. It is irrational, for 
example, to care more about those pleasures and pains that we shall have in 
the nearer future. A mere difference in when we shall be in pain is not a differ-
ence in the badness of this pain. Impartial Rationalists might similarly claim 
that we ought to be equally concerned about everyone’s life, since a mere dif-
ference in who is in pain is not a difference in the badness of this pain. 
Like the evolutionary debunking argument against (F), this argument seems 
to me to have some force, but is not decisive. The distinction between different 
times may be relevantly different from the distinction between different peo-
ple. The separateness of persons has been called ‘the fundamental fact for eth-
ics’, and this fact, Sidgwick plausibly believed, had great rational significance. 
Most of us would find it hard to believe that we have no reasons to be more 
concerned about our own well-being. 
If we admit that we have these reasons, we can respond to Sidgwick’s prob-
lem in another way. Sidgwick seems to have assumed that, when we have im-
partial reasons to act in one way, and self-interested reasons to act in some oth-
er way, these reasons are incomparable, in the sense that there are no truths 
about their relative strength. This assumption is, I have claimed, mistaken. 
Some self-interested reasons are decisively outweighed by some conflicting im-
partial reasons. We would have decisive reasons, for example, to do what 
would be slightly worse for ourselves if this act would save some stranger’s life. 
Sidgwick’s claim should have been only that, because such truths are impre-
cise, we often have sufficient reasons either to do what would be impartially 
better or to do what would be better for ourselves.  
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Similar remarks apply when it would be wrong to do what would be better 
for ourselves. Some self-interested reasons are decisively outweighed by some 
conflicting moral reasons. But when some wrong act would be much better for 
us than any of our other possible acts, we would sometimes have sufficient rea-
sons to act wrongly in this way. These reasons would be different on different 
moral views. Suppose first that, in  
Case One, after some shipwreck you could save either your own life or 
some stranger’s life. Though you could expect to live for many happy 
years, this stranger could expect to live happily for slightly longer, so 
that if you saved this stranger’s life you would be likely to make the out-
come slightly better. 
Act Consequentialists would believe that you would be acting wrongly if you 
saved your own life. But since this act would be likely to make the outcome on-
ly slightly worse, you would have only a weak moral reason not to act in this 
way. As Act Consequentialists should admit, this weak moral reason would not 
be stronger than your strong self-interested reason to give yourself many more 
years of happy life. You would have a sufficient reason to act wrongly by saving 
your own life. 
There are many actual cases of this kind. We could often make the outcome 
slightly better by doing something that would be much worse for ourselves. Act 
Consequentialists should admit that we would not have decisive reasons to act 
in these ways. Weak moral reasons do not always outweigh strong self-
interested reasons. 
Most of us are not Act Consequentialists. We accept some Non-
Consequentialist moral view, such as some form of Common Sense Morality. 
On such views, we are often morally permitted to give greater weight to our 
own well-being. In Case One, for example, you would have no duty to sacrifice 
your life so that you could give some stranger a slightly greater benefit.  
 
Suppose next that, in  
Case Two, you could save your life, but only by imposing harm on some 
stranger. 
On plausible Non-Consequentialist views, you would be morally permitted to 
save your life with some act that would cause this stranger to have a nasty 
bruise. It would be wrong, however, to save your life by imposing on this 
stranger some great harm. In between these extremes there would be some 
harms which are the greatest harms that you could justifiably impose when 
that is the only way to save your own life. If you imposed slightly more than 
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this justifiable amount of harm, your act would be only slightly wrong. Sup-
pose, for example, that you could justifiably save your life by imposing on 
some stranger N minutes of pain. If that is true, it could not be very wrong for 
you to save your life by imposing on this stranger N + 1 minutes of pain. Your 
self-interested reason to give yourself many happy years of life would not be 
outweighed by your weak moral reason not to impose slightly more than this 
justifiable amount of harm. You would have a sufficient self-interested reason 
to save your life by acting wrongly in this way. 
As these examples help to show, we sometimes have only weak moral rea-
sons to avoid acting wrongly. We cannot defensibly believe that these weak 
moral reasons would always outweigh even the strongest self-interested rea-
sons. That would be like Newman’s horrific view that sin is infinitely worse 
than pain, so that, if all mankind suffered extremest agony, that would be less 
bad than if one venial sin were committed. 
 
I shall now sum up these conclusions. According to 
Strong Egoistic Rationalists: We always have decisive reasons to do what 
is best for ourselves. 
According to 
Strong Moral Rationalists: We always have decisive reasons to do our 
duty, however weak this duty is, and however bad this act would be for 
ourselves.  
On Sidgwick’s view,  
we never have decisive reasons to do our duty if this act would be bad 
for ourselves.  
Defensible views, I have claimed, are in between these extremes. Neither self-
interested nor moral reasons are always decisive. When it is against our inter-
ests to do our duty, we often have decisive reasons to do our duty, but that is 
not always true. 
3. OTHER PROBLEMS 
Sidgwick’s problem is raised by conflicts between self-interested reasons and 
impartial moral reasons. Since Sidgwick was an Act Consequentialist, he be-
lieved that impartial reasons never conflict with moral reasons. If we accept 
some Non-Consequentialist moral view, we believe that, in some cases, these 
reasons do conflict. These cases raise some other problems.  
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When we are deciding what to do, we can ask: 
Q1: What ought I morally to do? Do I have a duty to act in some way, 
because every other possible act would be wrong? 
Q2: What do I have most reason to do? Do I have decisive reasons to act 
in some way? 
We can call these the Moralist’s Question and the Rationalist’s Question. Q2 
could be restated as  
Q3: Is there something that I ought to do in the decisive-reason-implying 
sense? 
The Rationalist’s Question is, I claimed, more fundamental. That can be 
shown by supposing that we have decisive reasons to act wrongly, or that we 
have no reason to care whether our acts are wrong. Morality would then have a 
status that is like that of etiquette, or some code of honour. If we had no reason 
to do what we ought morally to do, that would undermine morality. There 
could be no such truth the other way round. If it would be wrong for us to do 
what we have decisive reasons to do, that would not undermine these decisive 
reasons.  
Suppose next that, as some people believe, we always have decisive reasons 
to do our duty and to avoid actingly wrongly. If morality has such supreme 
importance, that would be true only because we had these decisive reasons, so 
it would still be these reasons that were fundamental.  
 
We can also ask 
Q4: How would it be best for things to go? 
One of two events would be better if we all have stronger impartial reasons to 
want and hope that this event will occur. It would be in this sense better, for 
example, if more people’s lives are saved.  
When Sidgwick discusses what we ought to do, he sometimes seems to be 
using ‘ought’, not in a moral sense, but in the decisive-reason-implying sense. 
When he states his principle of Rational Benevolence, Sidgwick writes: 
the good of any one individual is of no more importance [...] than the good of 
any other [...]. 
and  
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as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally [...]. I ought not to prefer 
my own lesser good to the greater good of another. 4 
Sidgwick here claims that he has most reason to aim at good generally. This 
claim does not imply that, if he aims at his own lesser good, his acts would be 
wrong in some distinctively moral sense, by being, for example, acts that are 
blameworthy, or unjustifiable to others, or acts that would give him reason for 
remorse and give others reasons for indignation.  And though Sidgwick’s pro-
foundest problem can be stated in moral terms, this problem is about the con-
flict between impartial and self-interested reasons. 
 
De Lazari-Radek and Singer make some similar remarks.  Singer has written: 
Thus, looking at things ethically is a way of transcending our inward-looking 
concerns, and identifying ourselves with the most objective point of view possi-
ble—with, as Sidgwick put it, ‘the point of view of the universe’. 5 
Ethics takes a universal point of view. 6 
Moral acts, understood as acts that are justifiable from an impartial perspective 
[...] are rationally required.7 
In summing up their view, de Lazari-Radek and Singer write: 
when one of two possible acts would make things go impartially better, that is 
what we have decisive normative reason to do. 8 
These are not distinctively moral claims, and they suggest that we have deci-
sive reasons to do whatever we have the strongest impartial reasons to do.  
We can now return to conflicts between moral and impartial reasons. If we 
are not Act Consequentialists, we believe that it would sometimes be wrong to 
do what we have the strongest impartial reasons to do. We should ask whether, 
in such cases, we might have sufficient or decisive impartial reasons to act 
wrongly.  
Here is another way to describe this question. What is distinctive of all Con-
sequentialist views is the central place, or greatest weight, that Consequential-
ists give to truths about how it would be best for things to go. Such views can 
 
4 ME 382-3. 
5 Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, third edition (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 293. 
6 Ibid., 11. 
7 Peter Singer, ed. Does Anything Really Matter? Parfit on Objectivity (Oxford University 
Press, forthcoming). 
8 P. 199. 
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take at least two forms. Some Consequentialists make claims about the moral 
importance of how well things go. According to these 
Act Consequentialists: We ought morally to do whatever would make 
things go best.  
Other Consequentialists make claims about the rational importance of how 
well things go. According to these people, whom I shall call 
Impartial Rationalists: We have strong reasons to do whatever would 
make things go best. 
As Sidgwick saw, but did not clearly enough state, Rational Egoism is best re-
garded, not as a moral view, but as an external rival to all moral views. We can 
make a similar claim about Impartial Rationalism. If we are not Act Conse-
quentialists, we believe that, in some cases, it would be wrong to do what 
would make things go best. Act Consequentialism is the internal rival to our 
moral view, since these Consequentialists reject some of our moral beliefs. Im-
partial Rationalists may not reject these beliefs, since these people may agree 
with us about which acts are right or wrong. But Impartial Rationalism may be 
an external rival to our moral view, since these Rationalists may believe that, 
in some cases, we would have sufficient or decisive reasons to act wrongly. 
According to Strong Impartial Rationalism, we have such decisive reasons 
whenever wrong acts would make things go best. As my earlier remarks imply, 
we should reject this view. On a more plausible view, which we can call 
Weak High Stakes Impartial Rationalism: When some wrong act would 
make things go much better than all our other possible acts would do, 
we would sometimes have sufficient or even decisive impartial reasons 
to act wrongly in this way. 
There are several kinds of act which most of us would believe to be wrong even 
when these acts would make things go better. We can take, as our example, 
some of the acts that would impose serious harm on some people as a means 
of benefiting others. According to what we can call 
the Means Principle: It would often be wrong to kill one person as a 
means of saving the lives of several other people. 
In one much discussed case, which we can call 
Bridge, some driverless runaway train is moving towards five people, 
whom it threatens to kill. You could save these people’s lives, but only by 
causing me to fall from some bridge onto the track, where this train 
would be stopped by hitting and killing me.  
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Many of us would believe this act to be wrong.  
 
The Means Principle does not imply that it would always be wrong to kill one 
person as a means of saving others. Such acts would be justified, this principle 
allows, if these acts were the only way of saving the lives of very many people, 
such as a thousand or a million people. If we believe that, in some cases, such 
acts would be justified, we should admit that, in some other similar cases, such 
acts would be only slightly wrong. On this view, there must be some rough 
number of people which is the smallest number whose lives we could justifi-
ably or permissibly save by killing one person as a means. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that this smallest number is 100 people. On this view, if we killed one per-
son as a means of saving only 99 other people, this act would be wrong. But 
this slight difference in the number of people whom our act would save could 
not make this act very wrong. We would have only a weak moral reason not to 
act wrongly in this way. We would have a strong conflicting impartial reason to 
act in this way, since this act would cause 98 fewer people to be killed. Since 
these reasons would conflict, we should ask whether either reason would be 
stronger. 
Since this act would be only slightly wrong, our moral reason would not, I 
believe, be decisive. This reason would, I believe, be outweighed by our impar-
tial reason to cause 98 fewer people to be killed. This would be a case in which 
we had a decisive impartial reason to act wrongly. 
We can next consider an example in which the stakes are higher, and the 
conflicting reasons might both be strong. We can imagine a state of the world 
that was roughly like its actual state in 1945. The US President, we can sup-
pose, could choose between two ways of ending the Second World War. The 
President has true beliefs about what would be the main effects of these two 
policies. In what we can call  
the Nuclear Policy, an atomic bomb would be dropped on one city in 
Japan, where it would kill about 100,000 civilians, most of them imme-
diately or very soon. 
This policy would swiftly end the war. The Japanese Government would soon 
surrender, because the use of this vastly destructive new weapon would give 
the generals in the Japanese Government what they would believe to be an 
honourable way to admit defeat. In what we can call 
the Conventional Policy, the US armed forces would instead invade Ja-
pan and would win the war by fighting in conventional ways. These 
methods would involve much bombing and fighting in highly populated 
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areas, whose unavoidable side-effects would be to kill at least 300,000 ci-
vilians before Japan surrendered. 
The Nuclear Policy would be, in one way, better than the Conventional Policy 
since this policy would cause at least 200,000 fewer civilians to be killed. On 
one widely accepted view, however, there is a great moral difference between 
two ways in which, when some nation is fighting a just defensive war, this na-
tion’s armed forces might kill some innocent civilians. On this view, it is some-
times permissible to use tactical bombing, which is aimed to destroy military 
targets such as arms factories, even if such bombing would predictably have 
the side-effect of killing some innocent civilians who live nearby. It is wrong, 
however, to use terror bombing, which deliberately kills civilians as a means of 
persuading some enemy to surrender. This Terror Bombing Principle  – which 
is one version of the Means Principle  – is accepted by many of those who 
think about the morality of war. 
If we accept this principle, we may believe that it would be wrong for the 
President to choose the Nuclear Policy. This policy would involve pure terror 
bombing, since the President’s only aim in dropping this atomic bomb would 
be to kill innocent civilians as a means of persuading the Japanese Govern-
ment to surrender.  
If we accept the Means Principle, we are not absolutists. We believe that we 
could justifiably kill one person as a means of avoiding killing some large 
numbers of other people. But this belief, we can suppose, would not apply to 
our example. If the President chose the Nuclear Policy he would kill many ci-
vilians as a means of avoiding killing only about three times as many other ci-
vilians. The proportions here are similar to those in Bridge, in which you 
could kill one person as a means of saving five other people. If we accept the 
Means Principle, we may believe that the President ought to choose the Con-
ventional Policy and invade Japan, since the Nuclear Policy would be very 
wrong. The President’s moral reason not to choose the Nuclear Policy con-
flicts, however, with a strong impartial reason. If the President chose this poli-
cy, he would end this war in a way that would kill 200,000 fewer civilians. 
Would this impartial reason outweigh this conflicting moral reason?  
This question is difficult, because we are comparing reasons of different 
kinds. It is easier to compare reasons which are all provided by the effects of 
our acts on different people’s well-being. We can ask, for example, whether we 
could justifiably impose some great burden on one person to save many other 
people from smaller burdens. The answer may depend not only on the size 
and number of these burdens, but also on how badly off these people are. 
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When we compare the reasons that are given by such facts, we can often plau-
sibly believe that some of these reasons outweigh others. 
It is harder to compare the President’s reasons for and against choosing the 
Nuclear Policy. The objection to killing people as a means isn’t given by the 
greater badness of such acts for the people who are killed. When people are 
killed as a means, that is not worse for these people than being killed as a side 
effect would be. If this act would be wrong, as the Means Principle implies, this 
act would be wrong because it is in itself morally bad to kill some people as a 
means of saving the lives of others. We must compare the President’s moral 
reason not to act wrongly in this way with his impartial reason to cause 
200,000 fewer people to be killed. 
This impartial reason, we may believe, would outweigh this moral reason. 
On this view, the President would have a decisive reason to act in a way that 
was very wrong. That conclusion would be disturbing.  
We may instead believe that the President’s moral reason would be decisive. 
If we are not Act Consequentialists however, this belief raises another problem. 
We may think 
We could always reasonably want and hope that things will go in the 
ways that would be best. 
It would often be best if some people acted wrongly. 
Therefore 
We could often reasonably want and hope that some people will act 
wrongly.  
I call this the Argument for Moral Ambivalence.  
 
We can next suppose that we are US citizens, and we know that the Presi-
dent will soon choose how to end the Second World War. We can ask what we 
could reasonably want or hope that the President will do. We believe that, if 
the President chooses the Nuclear Policy, he would be acting very wrongly. 
This fact would give us a reason to hope that the President will not choose this 
policy. We also know that, if the President makes this choice, he would end the 
war in a way that would cause at least 200,000 fewer civilians to be killed. This 
fact gives us an impartial reason to hope that the President will act very wrong-
ly, by choosing this policy. In asking what we could reasonably want or hope 
that the President will do, we must compare the strength of these conflicting 
reasons. 
Our impartial reason would, I believe, be clearly stronger. Some Non-
Consequentialists believe that one murder would be less bad than two acci-
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dental deaths, since it would be these deaths that we ought to prevent.  The 
argument for this view is, I believe, flawed, since it overlooks the badness of an 
attempted murder.  It is significant, however, that these people accepted this argu-
ment’s conclusion. These people found it intuitively acceptable that one per-
son’s being wrongly killed would be less bad than as few as only two accidental 
deaths. We cannot plausibly believe that, if the President chooses the Nuclear 
Policy, the badness of the President’s wrong act would be greater than the 
badness of as many as 200,000 deaths. We could reasonably want and hope 
that the President will act very wrongly in this way, so that these many fewer 
people would be killed.  
This conclusion would also be disturbing. If we could reasonably want and 
hope that the government of our nation will act very wrongly, that threatens 
the status of our moral beliefs. 
 
  
4. DISAGREEMENTS 
If we are Act Consequentialists, we avoid these conclusions. De Lazari-Radek 
and Singer suggest that, to defend Act Consequentialism, we can appeal to an-
other evolutionary debunking argument. Natural selection can explain why 
our ancestors had many of the non-impartial motives that were later endorsed 
by the beliefs of Common Sense Morality, such as our beliefs that we ought to 
promote the well-being of our close relatives and other members of our group, 
tribe, or community. These motives and beliefs were reproductively advanta-
geous. Natural selection can also explain how we became reciprocal altruists, 
or grudgers, who benefit only those other people who reciprocate by benefiting 
us in return. Reciprocal altruists also act in ways that spread their genes. Since 
these moral beliefs would have been reproductively advantageous whether or 
not they were true, this evolutionary explanation would undermine or at least 
weaken the justification of these beliefs.  
Natural selection cannot, however, explain how we came to have some other 
widely held moral beliefs. On the Golden Rule, for example, we ought to treat 
other people as we would want other people to treat us. Most of us would want 
other people to benefit us whether or not we benefit them. The Golden Rule 
therefore tells most of us to be, not grudgers, but suckers, who benefit every-
one, including people whom we know will never benefit us. Nor can natural se-
lection explain how we came to have several other impartial moral beliefs, such 
as the beliefs of Act Utilitarians. It was not reproductively advantageous to be-
184  DEREK PARFIT 
 
 
lieve that the suffering of all sentient beings matters, and matters equally. 
Since these impartial beliefs were not advantageous, they are not challenged by 
this evolutionary debunking argument.  
These claims about this argument are, I believe, plausible. As de Lazari-
Radek and Singer point out, however, though this argument challenges some 
widely held moral beliefs, it cannot by itself show that we ought to become Act 
Utilitarians. This argument applies to ‘many of our common moral judg-
ments’, which include ‘all kinds of partial moral judgments’, and all moral 
judgments that are based on ‘evolved evaluative atitudes’. But there are several 
widely held Non-Utilitarian moral beliefs that are not in these ways partial or 
based on such evolved attitudes. As de Lazari-Radek and Singer write else-
where: 
Other principles, including deontological principles, might be equally impartial 
– for instance, the principle that lying is wrong, whether one is lying to strangers 
or to members of one’s own community.9  
Other examples are some of the beliefs that are defended by Kantians or Con-
tractualists. Since this evolutionary argument does not apply to these Non-
Utilitarian moral beliefs, Act Utilitarians would have to defend their view by 
giving other arguments. 
  
Return now to the question whether we can justifiably believe that there are 
some objective, irreducibly normative truths. Many moral skeptics claim that, 
given the deep disagreements between many people’s moral beliefs, we cannot 
justifiably believe that there are any such moral truths. Sidgwick was greatly 
disturbed by such disagreements. As I have said, Sidgwick wrote: 
if I find any of my intuitions in direct conflict with an intuition of some other 
mind, there must be error somewhere: and if I have no more reason to suspect 
error in the other mind than in my own, reflective comparison between the two 
intuitions necessarily reduces me [...] to a state of neutrality. 10 
If we have such deep disagreements with other people, and we seem to have no 
reason to believe that we are the people who are much more likely to be getting 
things right, we cannot justifiably keep our beliefs, except in significantly 
weaker forms. We may even be led to doubt that any of us might be getting 
things right, by having true beliefs, since there may be nothing to get right. I 
called this the Argument from Disagreement. 
 
9 P. 203. 
10 ME 342. 
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Sidgwick’s Act Utilitarian beliefs often conflict with the beliefs of Common 
Sense Morality. In the longest part of his Methods, Sidgwick argues that these 
disagreements are not deep enough to count strongly against his Utilitarian be-
liefs. Summing up his claims, Sidgwick writes: 
the Utilitarian argument cannot be fairly judged unless we take fully into ac-
count the cumulative force which it derives from the complex character of the 
coincidence between Utilitarianism and Common Sense.  
 
If systematic reflection upon the morality of Common Sense thus exhibits the 
Utilitarian principle as that to which Common Sense naturally appeals for that 
further development of its system which this same reflection shows to be neces-
sary, the proof of Utilitarianism seems as complete as it can be made. 11 
In one passage de Lazari-Radek and Singer suggest that Utilitarians need not 
discuss the conflicts between their moral beliefs and Common Sense Morality. 
Act Utilitarians, they write, could 
draw on evolutionary theory, as well as on Sidgwick’s normative arguments in 
order to reject many widely-shared moral intuitions, while retaining the principle 
of universal benevolence. Although those who make use of reflective equilibrium 
in normative and applied ethics typically assume that they should try to achieve 
an equilibrium between a plausible normative theory and most, or at least many, 
of our commonly accepted moral judgments, there is no need for them to make 
this assumption. 
These claims are, I believe, too strong. De Lazari-Radek and Singer 
acknowledge the force of the Argument from Disagreement. They suggest 
that, to defend our moral beliefs, we should try to defend the view that, in ide-
al conditions, we would reach agreement with all other ‘careful thinkers’. Nor 
is it enough, as they themselves claim, to appeal to an evolutionary debunking 
argument. And as my last quotations suggest, Sidgwick’s normative arguments 
mainly consist in his many detailed claims about the relations between his 
Utilitarian principle and Common Sense Morality.12 
When I earlier discussed this Argument from Disagreement, I defended the 
Convergence Claim that, in ideal conditions, we would nearly all have suffi-
ciently similar normative beliefs. Many actual moral disagreements can be ex-
plained in ways that are untroubling in the sense that they do not cast doubt 
on this Convergence Claim. Some of these disagreements depend on disa-
greements about non-normative facts. Other disagreements are about border-
 
11 ME 422. 
12 Unlike Mill and Moore, whose defences of Act Consequentialism take less than a page, 
Sidgwick's defence take two hundred pages. 
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line cases, where we would expect some people to have conflicting beliefs. Two 
examples are disagreements about abortion and euthanasia. These disagree-
ments do not cast doubt on the nearly universally accepted view that it is 
wrong to kill innocent people. Other disagreements depend on conflicting re-
ligious beliefs, or on distorting factors, such as people’s assumption that, if cer-
tain moral beliefs were widely accepted, that would be good or bad for them.  
Some disagreements cannot yet be explained in these and other untrou-
bling ways. But these are early days. As Rawls and Nagel claim, our moral the-
ories ‘are primitive, and have grave defects’, and ‘ethical theory [...] is in its in-
fancy.’ 13 In responding to this argument for moral skepticism, we should 
therefore ask whether we can rationally hope to make progress in ways that 
make our disagreements less deep. In considering this question, we should try 
to avoid wishful thinking, by believing what we hope is true. 
In Volume One of On What Matters, I try to show that if three of the main 
systematic moral theories are revised in ways that seem to be clearly needed, 
these theories converge. In what will be my Volume Three, I try to show that, 
as Railton and Gibbard suggest, if three of the main meta-ethical theories take 
their best forms, these theories also converge. But the most worrying disa-
greements are not between different systematic moral theories or between dif-
ferent meta-ethical theories, but disagreements about what matters, and about 
which acts are right or wrong. The deepest disagreements of this kind are be-
tween Act Consequentialism and some parts of Common Sense Morality We 
should therefore ask whether these disagreements can be resolved. If this at-
tempt succeeds, that would support the view that there are some objective 
normative truths, some of which are moral truths. I start this attempt in the 
last two chapters of my Volume Three, and hope to continue this attempt in 
what would be my Volume Four. 
 
13 John Rawls, Theory of Justice, (Harvard University Press 1971) 52; Thomas Nagel, Other 
Minds (Oxford University Press, 1995) 102. 
